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UNCTAD V has left many commentators
seriously disillusioned about the prospects for
real progress in the North/South dialogue. The
Conference is judged to have been a failure
because it did not agree on any significant
measure which would lead to a rise in the
standard of living of the poor peoples of the
world. It was also distinguished by an open and
public squabble among the members of the Group
of 771 Conflicts of interest amongst them are
not new, but at Manila the widespread disagree-
ment seriously affected the work of the Con-
ference. This article is an attempt to analyse the
politics of the Group of 77 within the context of
the North/South debate.
The North/South Dialogue
Although the term 'North/South dialogue' is
generally used solely in connection with those
talks which have taken place since 1973, a
concerted attempt by the developing countries to
reform the international economic order can be
dated from the first UNCTAD Conference in
1964. It was here that, with an impressive display
of solidarity, they first presented a series of
linked demands for wide-ranging changes in
international economic relatiots. The events since
1973 have merely been an intensification of a
process begun a decade earlier.
The actions of a group of Third World com-
modity producers (oil exporters) to determine
unilaterally the price paid for their commodity
sent shock waves through the international
political and economic systems. To many com-
mentators, at the time and since, it constituted
an event of great significance.2 Whatever other
consequences the OPEC action had, it certainly
affected the perceptions of the state actors in
the international economy and led directly to
the initiation of what is known as the North/
South dialogue. The developed countries were
sufficiently alarmed to agree to the convening
of a Special Session of the UN General Assembly
and to acquiesce in the resolutions passed there.
1 The group currently consists of 119 members.
2 For example see Barraclough (1976: 31), where he talks of
'a watershed of history'.
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They feared that unless something was done, or
at least the appearance given that some action
was forthcoming, other developing countries
might follow OPEC's action. Subsequent events
have proved this fear unjustified. Although OPEC
still enjoys considerable success, the prospect of
future Third World commodity cartels exercising
sufficient control to imitate OPEC has receded.
Consequently, the developed countries now feel
less need to respond to Third World demands,
and the economic recession has seen them turning
inwards.3 In the last three years they have
become increasingly protectionist.
Within the North/South dialogue the main
conferences have been CIEC, UNCTAD IV and
UNCTAD V. Progress has been slow and there
have been few concrete results from the
developing countries' attempts to create a New
International Economic Order (NIEO).4
In pursuit of a NIEO, the developing countries
have made a three-pronged attack on the present
trading system and sought: (j) to change the
intellectual climate and to gain acceptance for
certain ideas thought to favour their economic
development, such as the acceptance of specific
aid targets and special treatment for the
economically disadvantaged; (ii) to negotiate
specific economic agreements, e.g. the General-
ised System of Preferences (GSP) and the Inte-
grated Programme for Commodities (IPC); and
(iii) to create new international economic
institutions or to restructure existing ones in
order to implement measures favourable to the
developing countries, such as the IMF's Com-
mittee on Reform of the International Monetary
System. This three-pronged attack thus embraces
a wide spectrum of objectives, including increases
in the price and volume of developing country
exports, the achievement by developed cOuntries
of the agreed goal of 07 per cent of GNP in
development assistance, greater control over the
activities of TNCS, increased access to technology
and to capital markets, and a reform of the
international monetary system.
3 l4ote the increasing number of summit meetings held
exclusively among the leaders of the foremost trading
nations.
4 For the record of attempts to create a NIEO. see UN(1974, 1974a, 1975 and l975a).
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These demands assume a distortion in the inter-
national trading system. Despite differences in
political and economic ideologies and in
economic strategies, the 77 are united in their
condemnation of the present international
economic system. This has provided a rallying
point and a basis for solidarity vis-à-vis the
developed countries. As the present UNCTAD
Secretary General has written,
For these countries the compelling need for a
new order is not based on the consideration
that the prevailing order is no longer working
well. lt is based on the more fundamental
premise that the prevailing order did not
satisfy their needs even when it was working
best. (UNCTAD 1976: 3, para 7.)
The Group of Seventy-Seven
The Group of 77 is a highly institutionalised but
informal organisation of developing countries
which acts primarily as a pressure group in the
Third World struggle for political and economic
change in the structure of the world economy.
The group is informal in the sense that it has no
headquarters, no constitution and no written rules
of procedure. Its high degree of institutional-
isation within UNCTAD is a function of the
group system which grew out of the political
differences at the 1964 Conference. For electoral
purposes states were divided into four lists which
reflected geographic and socio-economic factors.5
The Group of 77 is divided into three regional
subgroupsAfrican, Asian and Latin American.
Coordination takes place first at the regional
level, and the agreed regional positions are then
compared to produce a common group position.
This process takes place on a continuing basis and
before every UNCTAD Conference a meeting at
ministerial level is held.6
The degree of unity and coordination which
emerged at the 1964 Conference thus predated
the North/South dialogue, and in fact began in
the late I 950s with, for example, cooperation on
international economic issues such as the abortive
SUNFED. (For much of the 1950s, Cold War
alignments had meant that developing countries
were found on opposing sides during economic
debates, butfrom about 1958they had slowly
begun to find a common negotiating position
5 See the UN General Assembly Resolution 1995 (XIX) of
December 1964 which established UNCTAD as a permanent
body.
6 The first, second and third Ministerial Meetings were held
at Algiers. Lima and Manila before UNCTAD I, H and
¡It respectively.
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within the UN and GATT.) The significance of
1964 was that it established a framework to
enable this unity to continue after the Conference
ended.
Despite the changes in international relations
since 1964, the basic premise which produced the
Group still operates and provides the key to its
politics. This is that the shared interests of
members transcend the differences between them
and differentiate them as a group. These shared
characteristics reflect the member states' posi-
tion in the international economy, their levels
of economic development, and their relative
impotence to affect international policy when
acting singly. On the assumption that a coalition
might be able to wrest concessions from the
industrialised nations where an individual country
could not, solidarity became the leit-motif of the
77. The weakness which forced the developing
countries to unite in the first instance keeps them
united today.
Yet behind the outward show of solidarity there
are inherent conflicts which sometimes surface,
as at Manila. The most distinctive feature of the
Group of 77, apart from its unity, is the diver-
gence in levels of development, types of economy,
and political and economic philosophies amongst
its membership. Any group of over 100 states
which attempts to reach common agreement on
such a wide range of economic issues must have
internal tensions and find it difficult sometimes
to reconcile the various positions. Since 1964
the membership of the Group has increased by
42 and some countries have made significant
economic gains whilst others have made little
perceptible progress or have regressed. There are
differences both between and within the regional
groups. The greatest constraint on effective
solidarity is the manifest economic diversity: as
between the higher income countries (cg. Brazil,
Mexico and Argentina) and the lower income
countries (cg. Tanzania, Bangladesh and Chad);
as between the oil exporters and the rest; as
between those countries with strong manu-
facturing export sectors (cg. Taiwan, Singapore
and Brazil) and those without; and as between
the larger more diversified economies and the
smaller monocultural ones.
The general method of reconciling the different
interests is to aggregate them into a composite
resolution which accommodates all viewpoints.
This is not always possible, however, since
7 For the background to UNCTAD I see Cordovez (1967).
different demands may be irreconcilable. In these
cases the Group cannot proceed as quickly as
its members would wish, since efforts have to be
made to resolve conflicts and find an acceptable
compromise. For example, the negotiations
leading to the conclusion of an agreement on the
creation of a GSP were stymied not only by
developed country opposition but also by a
conflict between those developing countries
enjoying selective preference treatment, parti-
cularly the African associates of the European
Community who wanted equivalent advantages
under any new system, and those countries, led
by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, who argued for
the immediate dissolution of the selective
preference schemes. The evolution of the Inte-
grated Programme and the Common Fund also
reflected intra-77 tensions. A distinction can be
made between those members of the 77 who
wanted a restricted programme centred on a few
commodities and with limited aims (e.g.
Argentina, Brazil and Indonesia) and those who
wanted a more ambitious programme (e.g. the
African Group (Goodwin and Mayal! 1977: 152).
As the negotiations developed a third group of
countries emerged whose interest in the Common
Fund was to limit any adverse effects it might
have on their economies, e.g. India, Pakistan and
Sri Lanka. The 77 committed to solidarity did
not abandon the attempts at an Integrated Pro-
gramme or a Common Fund but sought instead
to reconcile these differences. The result was an
umbrella resolution which papered over the
significant differences between countries.8
UNCTAD V
UNCTAD V was the latest round in the North!
South dialogue. The omens for the success of the
Conference were not good since it was held in a
most unfavourable international climate. The
world economy is currently experiencing its worst
period since the end of the Second World War.
In a time of rising protectionism, mounting
energy prices and global recession, the developed
countries are not only disinclined to be chari-
table, but place short-term self interest before
more enlightened policies which would aid both
themselves and the developing countries.
Since 1976 the developed countries have
increasingly turned inward and the recent conclu-
sion of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN) show how little they are prepared to
respond to Third World demands. As originally
conceived in the Tokyo Declaration of September
1973, the MTN had two related objectives.
First, to liberalise world trade, and secondly to
secure additional benefits for the international
trade of the developing countries through a sub-
stantial improvement in the conditions of access
for the products of interest to the developing
countries and, where appropriate, to initiate
measures designed to attain stable, equitable and
remunerative prices for primary products. Yet, in
the event, the developing countries were largely
excluded from the negotiating process and
presented with a completed text which erodes
their preferential margins under the GSP.
Moreover, Britain and France are threatening to
impose selective import controls against countries
whose exports are deemed to be 'disruptive',
whether this is sanctioned by GATT or not.9
Further, it is the developing countries which have
been hardest hit by the rise in energy prices and
the increasing protectionism of the rich countries.
In the light of all this, it would have been folly
to expect UNCTAD V to produce any real
measure of agreement between the two sides.
This places the unity of the 77 even more at a
premium, But the present economic crisis has
also widened some of the divisions within the 77,
particularly between the oil-exporting nations and
the oil-importing nations. The fourth Ministerial
Meeting of the 77 was held at Arusha, Tanzania,
from 6-16 February 1979 and adopted the
Arusha Programme for Collective Self-Reliance
and Framework for Negotiations (UNCTAD (1)
1979). The purpose of the Ministerial Meeting
was to coordinate the positions of the three
regional groups and to obtain a measure of unity
and a common negotiating position before the
Manila Conference. To achieve this, the Arusha
Programme papered over the cracks, and some
developing countries, most notably Brazil, South
Korea and Argentina, were unhappy with the
result.
At Manila some of these latent differences came
out into the open. The major cause of dissension
was the insistence of the Latin American
countries, led by Costa Rica backed by
Argentina and Brazil, that energy should be
placed on the agenda, a move which was resisted
by the major oil exporters. The Latin American
countries were openly critical of the oil price
rise and the damage it was inflicting on the
economies of the oil importing developing
R On the development of the IPC in response to the 9 So far the only developing countries to have ratified the
differences within the 77 see Rangarajan (197g: 294-305). agreement are Argentina and Romania.
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countries. Latin American anger was fuelled not
only by their increased import bills but also by
the failure of the oil-rich states to adopt a more
sympathetic attitude to their fellow members of
the 77, more particularly those who have neither
very low per capita GDP nor very large Moslem
communities. The split within the ranks of the
77 was further aggravated by the support given
to the Latin Americans by the Group B
countries. This dispute, which continued until the
final week of the Conference, seriously affected
the ability of the 77 to reach common positions
on other issues. The other major split in the 77
was caused by a proposal sponsored by Kuwait
and Qatar to phase out flags of convenience. This
was vehemently opposed by many 77 members
who saw it as injurious to their interests. Liberia
led the opposition and was supported by
Panama, Cyprus, India, Taiwan, Singapore and
the Philippines.'0
With such a long and complex agenda there was
inherent scope for conflict among this large and
heterogeneous group of countries. The wider the
range of issues, the greater the diversity of
interests and hence the more difficult it became
to reconcile conflicting positions. In assessing the
unity of the 77 after Manila it should be
remembered that at all UNCTAD Conferences
some of the latent divisions within the Group
have surfaced, whether publiclyas at Manila-
or privately. At UNCTAD I the institutionalisa-
tion issue posed problems for solidarity. At
UNCTAD II, preferences and the least developed
countries were the major areas of disagreement.
At UNCTAD III it was the least developed,
relations with the European Community and
monetary relations that were stumbling blocks;
and at Nairobi, the Integrated Programme. How-
ever, the conflict within the 77 at Manila differed
in one significant way from previous ones. In past
conflicts the focus has been on resources held by
the developed countries, and at issue were
differences over strategy or the distribution of
these resources between developing countries.
This time the main dispute arose over resources
held by the developing countries themselves. In
the past, differences could be resolved by the
aggregation of the various demands into a
composite draft resolution, but this proved
10 A Liberian delegate referred to the move as 'an Arabplot to control world oil transport' (The Economist. 26
MayI June 1979: 97).
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impossible at Manila. It is difficult at this juncture
to predict exactly how this new development will
affect the 77's bargaining strategy and solidarity,
but it does provide a serious area of disagreement
and potential coalition-breaking. On the other
hand, the feeble results of Manila have brought
into question the whole feasibility of negotiated
structural change in the world economy. For the
77, Manila has once again demonstrated that
without solidarity they have little hope of
wresting significant concessions from the rich
countries, but that even with solidarity their gains
are minimal.
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